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ABSTRACT. Since the second half  of the 2000s, several options for implementing community-based forest management in the
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), like the local community forest concession (LCFC), have been discussed in the country’s
technical and political circles. Proposals and pilot testing have increased in the last five years, but the funding of initiatives is often
proposed for divergent purposes and taking different approaches. We reviewed current experiences in the Eastern province of the DRC
and found that nobody has carried out an estimation of the financial returns of the business models they drew up for/with the
communities involved. We therefore conducted a financial feasibility analysis for two case studies, estimating the costs of developing/
implementing activities and the benefits expected for the communities within the next five years. Three main conclusions were drawn
from the analysis: (1) most activities conducted under the LCFC model deal with rural development, and not with forestry operations
per se; (2) several forestry activities such as biodiversity conservation or carbon sequestration are not detailed in the management
documents and appear to have little legitimacy for local populations; (3) the two LCFCs show a negative financial performance because
the inception and implementation costs are substantially higher than the medium-term profits. Community forestry is unlikely to
develop in the DRC unless local people are guaranteed that it will contribute to improving their livelihoods, notably their financial and
physical capital. This requires that LCFC initiatives focus on actual productive uses of forest resources, which financial performance
is systematically assessed ex ante. A simplification of the legal constraints is also needed to reduce the cost of creating and managing
a LCFC.
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INTRODUCTION
No successful community forests in Central Africa without
livelihood improvement
Social forestry emerged in the 1970s and quickly took a variety
of forms, including community-based forest management
(CBFM), which most directly involves local populations in forest
management (Cernea 1986, Nguinguiri 1999). Evidence of
successful common property regimes in various contexts
combined with the failures of centralized management in
controlling deforestation have led governments to increasingly
consider CBFM as a solution for achieving the objectives of
sustainable development: it should increase welfare for rural
populations, conserve forest resources, and improve local
governance through the transfer of management authority and
the recognition of customary rights over lands and resources
(Gibson et al. 2000, Kellert et al. 2000, Pagdee et al. 2006, Maryudi
et al. 2012). In reality, the benefits of the CBFM programs have
often failed to materialize. Even where central governments have
actually ceded authority and management of forests to local
communities, the lack of attention to institutional and social
factors is usually presented as the main reason to explain that
CBFM initiatives have fallen short of their stated goals (Edmunds
and Wollenberg 2003, Tole 2010). There is a very rich literature
on institutional arrangements for CBFM, which theorizes that
the success of community forestry is governed by the prior
establishment of an adequate institutional framework and the
strengthening of social capital (Hanna et al. 1996, Pagdee et al.
2006, Tole 2010, Baynes et al. 2015). This assumption of the pre-
eminence of institutional and social conditions in the success of
community forestry may be questioned when the people, who will
ultimately have to implement the community forestry model, live
in very harsh conditions and struggle to meet their basic needs.
In these conditions, the weak evidence of a significant economic
impact of community forestry on local livelihoods is an
overlooked obstacle to the success and the extension of this
approach (Baynes et al. 2015). Hajjar et al. (2016) carried out a
comprehensive review of CBFM performance and showed that
livelihood outcomes were reported in 30–40% of the cases, and
that only 24% were measured using quantitative surveying
techniques. In addition, most of this work focused on ways of
covering local needs (Padgee et al. 2006) or on the equitable
distribution of benefits among community members (Thoms
2008), and not on increasing the net incomes of rural households.
Few studies carried out ex ante or ex post quantification of
individual and collective livelihood outcomes at village level (Tole
2010, Hajjar et al. 2016). In addition, when a financial assessment
of the CBFM scheme was carried out, Humphries et al. (2012,
2018) showed that most cases did not include the full range of
costs and neglected potentially large costs, such as technical
assistance and machinery depreciation, which are subsidized.  
In Central Africa, the focus of this article, a similar observation
can be made on Cameroon, the first country to legally adopt and
implement the CBFM model since the 1990s, with the aim to
exploit forest resources sustainably for the benefit of the
communities and, to some extent, according to their own rules
(Ekoko 2000, Topa et al. 2009). Cameroon adopted this approach
in 1994 and implemented it from the end of the 1990s. The creation
of formal community forests (CF) allowed village associations to
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legally harvest, process, and trade forest resources over a
maximum area of 5000 hectares respecting the rules of a simple
management plan (SMP) approved by the administration. But
the absence of significant impacts of CBFM on rural livelihoods
and the complicated administrative procedures have hindered the
extension of this model. In 2017, out of 335 validated SMPs, 274
of them had been completed with the signature of a letter of
agreement with the public authorities. However, only 161 of them
were active as they benefitted from a Certificate of Harvesting
License. Twenty years after the creation of the CFs, it is only about
1% of the national area of Cameroon that is operated under CF
status, and 2% of the national land area that is allocated to CFs
(most of which are not active). This relative failure must be linked
to the governance of the forest sector, which is still not very
favorable to social forestry, but also and mainly to the weak impact
of this approach on rural populations.  
In Cameroon, the objective assigned to community forestry was
primarily social and institutional (Etoungou 2003, Cuny et al.
2004, Oyono 2005, Assembe Mvondo et al. 2011). It relied on the
premise that communities are closely related to the surrounding
forests, not only for their daily livelihood but also for cultural and
religious purposes. They were therefore expected to play an
important role in the common decision-making procedures and
implementation of forestry activities. But in poor rural societies,
such as in the forest zone of Cameroon, people’s engagement in
community forestry is motivated by their expectations of raising
their standard of living (De Jong et al. 2018). According to the
sustainable livelihoods framework (Chambers and Conway 1992,
Scoones 1998), rural livelihoods are made of five types of assets,
two of which focus on the material conditions of the communities:
(1) physical capital, i.e., the capital base that is essential for the
pursuit of any livelihood strategy; (2) financial capital, i.e.,
income, savings, credit, and other inflows. However, the rise of
these two types of capital has been disappointing for 20 years in
Cameroon, for three reasons.  
First, the start-up costs for a community forest are out of the
reach of local populations: it is necessary to spend more than
US$30,000 even before signing the CF management agreement
with the administration (Lescuyer et al. 2016). Such a level of
starting costs is partly because of the complex and expensive
regulations imposed on creating and running a CF in Cameroon
(Vermeulen et al. 2006, Julve Larrubia et al. 2013). It explains the
dependence of communities on external actors who can
financially and technically support the upfront costs of CF
creation and utilization. For example, it is extremely rare for a
community to engage in a community forestry process without
the support, or even leadership, of an NGO or an elite. Forest
companies also provide important technical support to
communities because most CFs are exploited through a
subcontract with a logging company, not by the communities
themselves (Vermeulen et al. 2006, Cuny 2011, Julve Larrubia et
al. 2013). Thus these external actors capture part of the subsidies
or rent derived from the exploitation of forest resources, which
were a priori intended for local populations.  
Second, the low (and sometimes negative) level of profit has been
a common criticism of community forestry in Cameroon.
Logging is the main source of revenues from CFs but this activity
remains marginal, with a global turnover in Cameroon of around
US$2 million per year (Lescuyer et al. 2016). Local people remain
the primary beneficiaries of community forestry, mainly because
of income that is generated from logging and distributed to
workers (Nzoyem, Vabi, Kouokam, and Azanga 2010,
unpublished manuscript). These individual incomes are very low
when equally distributed among the community members (Cuny
2011, Oyono et al. 2012) and without considering the usually poor
distribution of CF revenues in favor of local political, economic,
or military elites (Oyono 2005, Ribot et al. 2010). Last, few
collective investments were funded by the revenues drawn from
the exploitation of the CFs because of the low level of net profit
and of institutional problems within the CF management
committee (Oyono et al. 2006, 2012, Ezzine de Blas et al. 2009,
Cuny 2011).  
The low impact on physical and of financial capital at the village
scale is a major hurdle to increase the number of CFs in
Cameroon. In poor rural contexts, an increase in local welfare is
a precondition for the long-term involvement of population in
community forestry. The Cameroonian failure of the community
forestry model so far is worrying because it has been replicated
for about 15 years in Central African countries. Gabon and the
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) have included community
forestry in their new forestry regulations since the early 2000s,
while the Central African Republic adopted a decree in 2015 to
implement community forests, which was already provided for in
its 2008 forestry law. The study of the contribution of community
forestry to local livelihood improvement through the
accumulation of wealth and an increase in income is particularly
important in DRC where community forestry initiatives (i) have
recently been backed by several legal instruments, (ii) carry the
potential to cover vast surfaces of the national forests, and (iii)
should be implemented with the integration of small-scale,
artisanal loggers in the business model. We introduce these topics
below.
The rise of community forestry in the DRC, but for whose
benefit?
Several recent regulatory changes have made it possible to start
community forestry in the DRC. In 2002, the DRC forestry law
created the concept of “local community forest,” which lacked
detail but confirmed the existence of legitimate customary rights
over forests (Trefon 2008). These local community forests can be
requested by communities on the basis of their customary rights.
Their surface area is not limited but they must be located outside
classified and permanent production forests. Local community
forest status confirms the possession of this space by a community
but does not correspond to a title deed, which remains owned by
the state.  
After a decade of debates among stakeholders and practitioners
(Vermeulen and Karsenty 2015), the forest law was gradually
completed by three regulations with a view to opening up a
pathway to formalize the vast sector of small-scale logging in the
DRC (Lescuyer et al. 2014). First, Decree 14/018 dated 2 August
2014 established the concept of “local community forest
concession” (LCFC) whose maximum size is 50,000 ha delineated
inside a local community forest. The LCFC allows the community
to formally exploit forest resources for subsistence or commercial
purposes. The exploitation of resources in the LCFC must follow
sustainable management rules. Then, Ministerial Order 25 dated
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Fig. 1. Pilot experiments in community forestry in the Democratic Republic of Congo.
9 February 2016 provided the rules for managing and using
LCFC. Last, Ministerial Order 84 dated 29 October 2016
explained how small-scale logging must be carried out inside
LCFCs. A new institutional context has also been established to
facilitate the enforcement of these regulations, with the creation
in 2014 of a subdepartment devoted to community forestry at the
Ministry of the Environment and the recent validation of a
national strategy to promote community forestry in the DRC.  
The concepts of local community forest and LCFC are the two
current forms of CBFM in the DRC. Most CBFM initiatives have
at least one of these two objectives but they are at varying levels
of achievement. At the beginning of 2018, only a few LCFCs had
been created and on very small surfaces. In the absence of formal
recognition of a local community forest or LCFC, we will use the
generic terms of CBFM or community forestry to refer to these
initiatives. Since the end of the 2000s, many pilot experiments
have been launched to test and contribute to the application of
the CBFM approach in DRC. Figure 1 illustrates the large number
of CBFM projects that were active between 2010 and 2015 (Bauer
2016).  
Like in Cameroon, all these initiatives were subsidized by
international funds and most of them were run by local or
international NGOs. Their purpose was both to contribute to
designing clear management rules for CBFM and to test them for
various land uses: biodiversity protection, carbon sequestration,
small-scale logging, sustainable hunting, fuelwood production.
Yet their initial implementation seems to show shortcomings, and
raises questions similar to those already highlighted for
Cameroon (Kakelengwa et al. 2016), which we try to answer in
the remaining of this article. First, does such a model have the
ability to lift communities out of poverty? Second, will the
redistribution of resources derived from the forest generate
benefits for rural communities? These questions arise from the
premise that resources from local forests should help to increase
the revenues of decentralized entities and households in the
communities involved, but this is still far from being demonstrated
in the DRC.  
The objective of this article is thus to assess the capacity of
community forestry, as it is currently implemented in the DRC,
to increase individual or collective incomes in rural communities.
We conduct a financial analysis that applies only to real income
flows and not to all the economic benefits potentially generated
by a LCFC. The latter may be important, as shown by Beauchamp
and Ingram (2011), but the increase in real income is a major
precondition for the success of the community forestry at the local
level. Our analysis also applies only to the community scale and
does not take into account the potential revenues generated for
nonlocal actors. Overall, our estimate focuses only on the actual
financial benefits that communities can realistically expect from
exploiting the resources located in the LCFC, in order to test the
assumption that current CBFM experiences increase local
livelihoods, notably through more revenues for the community
members.  
We focused on and reviewed the pilot experiments carried out in
the former Eastern province, and more specifically in the
provinces of Tshopo and Ituri where the largest number of pilots
is found, to examine the extent to which the financial impacts of
the LCFCs had been taken into account when setting up the
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Fig. 2. Location of the two sites.
projects and we analyze the profitability of these investments for
those communities. To do this, the results are organized into three
sections: (1) the identification of actual sources of local revenue
among the different activities envisaged in the LCFCs; (2) the
estimation of the costs of creating and running a LCFC; (3) the
estimation of the financial net present value of the future LCFC
through the application of cost-benefit analysis. These results feed
a discussion on possible measures to increase the impact of
community forestry on people’s incomes in order to facilitate its
extension in the DRC and strengthen its contribution in the fight
against poverty.
METHODS
The financial analysis of community forestry initiatives in the
provinces of Tshopo and Ituri was carried out in three stages.
These provinces were selected because of the high number of
CBFM initiatives launched there over the latest decade (Fig. 1).  
First, we identified most of the CBFM initiatives in 2016 in these
two provinces by interviewing the forest administration, NGOs,
the University of Kisangani, and donors known to support
community forestry. We then met with the leaders of the CBFM
initiative on one to three occasions, with a total of eight meetings,
and collected the management documents prepared for each of
these initiatives. We then selected two case studies, Lolwa and
Uma, which were relatively advanced in setting up a LCFC and
for which we had collected many documents that described the
activities to be conducted (Fig. 2). The two experiences have been
at stand still for a few years because of lack of funds to complete
the procedures.  
Because of a lack of official template to design the SMP, many
activities to be conducted in the LCFC were little detailed and
poorly quantified in the technical reports. Where information
from these documents was incomplete or out of step with existing
regulations, it was supplemented, adjusted, or detailed during
community surveys. To that purpose, we visited the two CBFM
initiatives to supplement the information collected in Kisangani.
At the pilot sites, 12 focus group discussions and 50 individual
interviews with key users and managers were organized. These
surveys had three purposes: (1) to detail the planned activities in
the future LCFC over the coming five years; (2) to quantify the
financial benefits and costs expected from these activities; and (3)
to depict the current practices and the institutional settings under
which they can currently operate, e.g., rules of access, taxes paid,
etc. All productive activities in the LCFC were carried out by the
communities themselves but with the obligation to abide by the
current regulations, for instance for small-scale logging or hunting
permits. The main characteristics of these sites, as well as the main
assumptions for the calculation of financial costs and benefits,
based on data collected in the management documents, which
have been adjusted/completed by socioeconomic surveys in the
villages, are presented in Appendix 1.  
Last, we ran a cost-benefit analysis (CBA) to quantify the
financial performance of the future LCFC project through the
calculation of its net present value (NPV). By definition, the
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financial benefits were related to the revenue streams accruing to
the local actors (Brent 2006). Inflows consisted of sales of forest
resources. They were gross financial benefits, or turn-over.
Outflows were the actual costs incurred by the actors to obtain
financial benefits. The total financial cost aggregated investment,
operating, and transaction costs. The difference between the gross
financial benefit and the financial cost was the net benefit, i.e.,
the profit that the actors drew from the activity.  
The CBA was done for a five-year period only. This choice is
justified by the high preference for the present of rural populations
in the DRC, which is explained by the uncertain political and
economic contexts and which is characterized in particular by a
very low savings rate (Mansesa Kiakumba 2013). Hatfield (2005)
used, for example, a time preference rate of 40% for subsistence-
level rural communities in the North Kivu province. In such a
context, it is difficult for rural populations to make their decisions
on the basis of a time horizon that exceeds a few years.  
The high consumers’ preference for present consumption in the
DRC also influences the choice of the discount rate as it is often
estimated through a combination of the marginal social rate of
time preference and of the capital productivity rate. The latter is
often estimated on the basis of the central bank’s key rate, which
varied between 15% and 23% in 2017 in the DRC. Combining
these two rates, the financial discount rate should be in the range
of 25% to 30%. For a public or common good whose management
is in the long term, it is desirable to opt for a social discount rate,
whose level is much lower to better take into account the interests
of future generations (Fisher and Krutilla 1975, Norgaard and
Howarth 1991). However, this consideration should be played
down in this study, which focuses on the financial income expected
by local populations over a five-year horizon. Finally, we decided
to apply a discount rate of 12%, which is a compromise between
the financial and social discount rates. A similar rate is also used
by the African Development Bank (AfDB 2013) to assess the
financial feasibility of long-term investments in road
infrastructure and by the International Monetary Fund for
copper and gold mines in the DRC (NRGI 2016). However, to
test the sensitivity of the financial analysis results to discount rate
levels, a sensitivity analysis is also conducted with a discount rate
of 5% and 25%. We used a parity of 1$ for 1000 Congolese francs.
Inflation was not considered in the calculations.
RESULTS
We bring together the main elements needed to implement the
financial CBAs at the two sites, namely a list of activities
generating financial benefits from the use of forest resources, an
assessment of the cost of creating a LCFC, and quantification of
the financial benefits and costs associated with managing the
LCFC.
A few forest-related and pro-poor activities in the LCFCs
Consultation of the various management documents developed
for the establishment of the LCFCs made it possible to list all the
activities planned at the two sites; they are indicated by a cross in
Figure 3. Out of these, we identified those that were associated
with forest space (boxes marked out with horizontal lines), those
for which at least some benefits and/or costs were quantified in
the management documents (boxes marked out with vertical
lines), and those that combined these two characteristics (boxes
marked out in squares).
Fig. 3. Activities planned in the community forests. Those that
were associated with forest space are marked out with
horizontal lines, those for which at least some benefits and/or
costs were quantified in the management documents are
marked out with vertical lines, and those that combined these
two characteristics are marked out in squares.
Various activities are envisaged in each of the LCFCs, but many
of them are not directly associated with forest management. For
example, intensive agriculture is the main detailed and quantified
activity at both sites. However, from this perspective, the SMP
would become a rural development plan and not a management
plan for forest-related resources.  
If  we focus on the forest area alone, several activities are
mentioned in the management documents, such as biodiversity
protection, carbon sequestration, and nontimber forest product
(NTFP) harvesting, but they are not quantified. Group and
individual discussions in the communities also failed to develop
scenarios for the implementation of these activities, either because
of a lack of data (for example for NTFPs) or because of a limited
interest, or even a difficult understanding, of the communities for
these activities, e.g., carbon sequestration and biodiversity
conservation. In both cases, these activities do not represent a
source of additional income according to these populations,
either because the LCFC will not add value to the current practice
of harvesting NTFPs, or because there is virtually no operational
scheme of payment for environmental services for the benefit of
communities in the DRC. The choice of these activities seemed
to be the result of a top-down decision-making process, where the
conservation-oriented agenda of the supporting NGOs (and
donors) tended to impose itself  on the real expectations of
communities regarding the use of their natural resources.  
In total, in the two case studies, there were only three activities
associated with the forest area for which quantified information
existed in the management documents and/or from field surveys:
sustainable hunting, small-scale logging, and charcoal
production. These three activities are familiar to local populations
and they have been conducted extensively and informally,
irrespective of the presence of the LCFC (Schure et al. 2014,
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Valimahamed et al. 2017). Communities were also aware of the
longer distances and time they had to spend in conducting
present-day activities as compared to 10 years ago. For instance,
although in the communities hunting used to take place between
3.5 km and 4 km away 10 years ago, today such distances rise to
14.5 km and 17 km, respectively. Similar increments were reported
for charcoal making, logging, and agriculture. This seems to
indicate that current activities, in addition to growing
demographic pressure, may tend to be unsustainable in the long
run. The objective of creating a LCFC is to formalize and secure
these activities, while ensuring the sustainability of the harvest
through compliance with the SMP. A financial feasibility
assessment makes it possible to estimate the profitability of this
approach for communities.
Exorbitant costs of creating LCFCs
Between 2010 and 2015, numerous steps were taken at both sites
to create these LCFCs. In addition, the regulations were
completed in February 2016 with the publication of Ministerial
Order 25, which added several steps to the creation of a LCFC.
Table 1 summarizes the total cost of creating these two LCFCs,
compiling the actual expenditures at the sites and the additional
expenditure required to meet current regulations.
Table 1. Cost of creating the local community forest (CF)
concession at the two pilot sites.
 
Steps of the formal procedure Total cost (US$)
Uma CF Lolwa CF
Information and validation meetings 4700 4950
Setting up of management committees 9980 12,000
Delimitation and mapping 66,470 16,000
Forest inventory 14,825 11,000
Baseline studies 9500
Drafting of the Simple Management Plan 4000 3500
Drafting and filing of the logging permit
application
3150
Costs for venue of provincial and national
authorities
9300 11,200
Total amount of actual expenses
 
112,425 68,150
Extra costs to comply with Ministerial Order 25 dated 9 February 2016
Creation of Supervision and Monitoring
committees
6120
Writing and adoption of new statutes 5385
Training of the committee members 9000
Investments and running costs for local
committees
12,260
Costs for venue and involvement of local
authorities
8716
Total cost of compliance with current regulations 153,906 109,631
Financial CBA for the two LCFCs
Data contained in the management documents or collected
through surveys at the community level were combined to build
scenarios for the use of LCFC resources over the coming five
years and to quantify the respective costs and financial benefits
for the two initiatives with a 12% discount rate (Tables 2 and 3).  
In neither case was LCFC management cost-effective to the
community from a financial point of view because the net present
value was negative. The change of the discount rate does not
modify the result, because the NPVs remains negative in all cases
(Table 4).
Table 2. Financial cost-benefit analysis for the Lolwa local
community forest concession.
 
in US$ Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5
Creation costs 109,631
Small-scale logging
 Starting costs 64,569 12,630 12,630 14,915 12,630
 Running costs 90,460 90,912 90,912 90,912 90,912
 Turn-over 121,500 121,500 121,500 121,500 121,500
Sustainable hunting
 Starting costs 2630 3630 4630 3000 3000
 Running costs 25,645 50,290 74,935 75,285 76,703
 Turn-over 27,000 54,000 81,000 81,000 81,000
Fuelwood collection
 Starting costs 1255 1255 1255 1255 1255
 Running costs 6300 12,600 18,300 25,200 31,500
 Turn-over 12,000 24,000 36,000 48,000 60,000
Net benefits -139,990 28,183 35,838 39,933 46,501
Net Present
Value
-25,251
Table 3. Financial cost-benefit analysis for the Uma local
community forest concession.
 
in US$ Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5
Creation costs
Small-scale logging
 Starting costs 35,503 8298 10,253 8298 10,253
 Running costs 183,844 172,997 172 997 181,067 172,997
 Turn-over 160,165 160,165 160,165 160,165 160,165
Sustainable hunting
 Starting costs 5215 3455 0 0 0
 Running costs 36,968 36,968 36,968 37,643 38,351
 Turn-over 54,000 54,000 54,000 54,000 54,000
Net benefits -201,270 -7552 -6052 -12,842 -7436
Net Present
Value
-202,414
Table 4. Sensitivity analysis with a change of discount rate.
 
in US$ Discount rate
5% 12% 25%
Net Present
Value Lolwa
- 7515 - 25,251 - 44,012
Net Present
Value Uma
- 220,155 -202,414 -176,645
The negative financial return of the LCFCs is explained by two
reasons. On the one hand, the cost of creating the LCFC
contributed very significantly to the total cost of managing a
LCFC. Without this start-up cost, the Lolwa LCFC would have
a positive NPV. On the other hand, the production activities
planned in the LCFCs had low or even sometimes negative profit
rates, which partly resulted from the substantial cost of
formalizing small-scale production activities in the DRC. The cost
of formalization is particularly high for chainsaw milling and this
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activity is also characterized by the payment of many salaries,
which make it unprofitable in Uma and marginally profitable in
Lolwa. Sustainable hunting in the two LCFCs has a positive NPV
because the cost of legal hunting remains limited and because
most of the time spent hunting is not paid for. But it is mainly the
production of firewood that presents a high NPV in Lolwa, which
is explained by low costs to access the resource, to get the
equipment and to legalize this activity.
DISCUSSION
The DRC is in the start-up phase of community forestry, which
partly explains the difficulties encountered in setting up LCFCs
and the costs associated with this approach. However, both case
studies showed that the current community forestry approach is
failing financially, which will prevent real ownership of the scheme
by rural populations. Two avenues are discussed to increase the
financial attractiveness of community forestry in the DRC. On
the one hand, community forestry should be focused on and
demonstrate short- and medium-term profitable activities in rural
areas. On the other hand, the complexity and formal cost of
developing and managing a LCFC must be reduced to become
bearable by the communities.
The need to demonstrate the contribution of CBFM to
households’ financial capital
In the vast majority of rural areas in tropical countries, people
spend most of their time and earn most of their income from
farming activities. These farming activities are a priori outside
the scope of community forestry: the DRC’s forest law is clear
and specifically speaks of local community forests as land covered
by trees or shrubs capable of providing forest products, sheltering
wildlife, and having a direct or indirect effect on the soil, climate,
or water regime (Vermeulen and Karsenty 2015). This therefore
excludes agricultural landscapes, even if  the definition of forest
may include agroforestry systems or savannahs. It is unlikely that
an SMP that focuses on changing agricultural practices, fish
farming, or mineral exploitation could be validated by the DRC’s
forestry administration. Still, community forestry is therefore only
one possible option to increase the financial capital of
communities. Other pro-poor activities, such as the improvement
and intensification of agricultural practices, can be supported by
rural development actions, without the need to follow the complex
process of securing forest space by setting up a LCFC.  
However, in many villages, the exploitation of forest resources
offers opportunities to increase the income of local populations
in the short and medium term, notably through community
forestry. But, as illustrated by our case studies, a common
difficulty with current CBFM initiatives in the DRC is relying on
an ideal vision of what LCFCs could achieve and not on the actual
practices of the local population. In contrast to the Cameroonian
experiments in which timber logging is the priority issue, most
current CBFM initiatives in the DRC target biodiversity
conservation and carbon sequestration, although these benefits
remain insubstantial for local people (Eisen et al. 2014, Bauer
2016) probably because there have been very few experiences in
Central Africa where these economic benefits have been converted
in monetarized rewards for community (Maniatis et al. 2013).
Despite the prevalent rhetoric of community empowerment and
participation, community forestry is often promoted in a top-
down manner in which the intervening (and often funding)
agencies impose their normative values and sophisticated
management tools (Pokorny et al. 2010, Maryudi et al. 2012,
Hajjar et al. 2013). A bottom-up approach that takes into account
the needs, wishes and current realities of communities can lead
to better designed support systems than those brought in from
outside (Malla et al. 2003, Thoms 2008, Hajjar et al. 2013).  
The design of LCFCs on the basis of credible forest management
activities is an important but not a sufficient step to maximize
financial benefits for communities. It is also crucial to know
whether the forest management scenario is actually beneficial for
the communities and to select the most profitable options. In the
two case studies, the financial return of each productive activity
varies according to the natural and socioeconomic contexts,
although the cost of formalization remains an overall issue for
small-scale rural businesses, as observed by Anderson et al. (2015)
in Cameroon, Indonesia, and Nepal.  
The lack of financial viability of CFLCs in the DRC runs counter
to the few estimates of the profitability of CFs, specialized in
timber exploitation, summarized by Humphries et al. (2018) in
Latin America and Africa, whose rates of return range from 23%
to 1133%. There are several reasons for this difference. First, there
is obviously a selection bias in the choice of these CFs with a focus
on a few successful initiatives rather than estimating the financial
results of a random sample constructed from the thousands of
existing CFs. Second, several of these evaluations combine
financial and economic benefits, which makes them difficult to
compare and tends to inflate the profit rate for some of these
studies. Finally, most of these studies do not take into account
the costs of the CF creation since they are generally covered by
funding from outside the communities.  
However, three lessons can be drawn to make community forestry
a financially viable option for communities. First of all, there is
a whole consensus on the need for initial support from
governments and other partners for start-up capital, subsidized
access to training and technical assistance, and navigating
complex bureaucratic systems (Humphries et al. 2018), without
this support being transformed into substitution and dependence
for communities. Second, it is crucial to analyze how local
productive systems can be integrated into sustainable and
lucrative value chains (Ezzine de Blas et al. 2009). Third, the
implementation of an ex ante analysis of financial performance
before committing to operations would allow communities and
their partners to engage in activities that are not unprofitable in
the medium term. To date, in DRC, no CBFM initiative has
conducted an ex ante financial analysis. Similarly, the community
forestry support tools package developed in 2017 by international
and national NGOs, in collaboration with the DRC Ministry of
Environment and Sustainable Development, does not contain any
financial analysis module.
The obligation to decrease the costs of procedures and
institutional arrangements
A pragmatic and profitable exploitation of forest resources is a
necessary step to promote LCFC in the DRC. However, its overall
impact on local livelihoods will be limited as long as communities
have to bear an exorbitant cost to create and rule a LCFC. This
cost is now almost entirely borne by external funders in the DRC
(Bauer 2016). Without a simplification of national regulations,
this dependence on external funding will prevent most rural
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populations from engaging in community forestry or will favor
illegal practices to cover these costs, as the Cameroonian
experience has clearly shown (Cuny 2011, Lescuyer et al. 2016).  
The cost of setting up and operating a LCFC is largely attributable
to the various committees set up in the community to manage this
system: a committee of the elders, a community assembly, a
management committee, a monitoring and control committee.
The level of organization required for LCFCs is even higher than
that required in other Central African countries, where
organizational difficulties remain a key weakness (Karsenty,
Lescuyer, Ezzine de Blas et al. 2010, unpublished manuscript).
These regulatory provisions are generally justified by the will to
limit the risks of abuse by traditional chiefs (Vermeulen et al.
2011). They also aim to prevent this form of decentralization from
being transformed into a new way of capturing the rent derived
from the exploitation of forest resources by outside private or
public actors (Jacquemot 2010). However, the complexity of the
local institutional set-up plays against the efficiency of the
approach, requiring a significant proportion of the income
generated by the LCFC to be devoted to operating the
institutional system at the expense of investments for the well-
being of the community, without avoiding elite capture either.  
This multiplication of local committees in charge of the LCFC
also runs the risk of being misunderstood and deemed
unnecessary by the populations themselves. As shown by Milabyo
Kyamusugulwa et al. (2014) in the neighboring province of North
Kivu, the local population did not press for better or more
institutions on managing the projects’ resources. The desire to
improve the governance of common forest resources might
represent a kind of supply-without-demand: the governance gap
that the CBFM project seeks to fill is not necessarily experienced
as such by the population, especially if  its content is not consistent
with people’s daily lives and knowledge. Congolese regulations
may have been too prescriptive in imposing these various
committees and their operating procedures. A more pragmatic
approach would have been to set out some broad principles of
governance for CBFM, leaving each community to choose its own
criteria for implementing them.
CONCLUSION
Community forestry in the DRC took many forms over the last
decade before recent regulations set out more precise conditions
for its implementation. These different modalities for
implementing LCFCs reflect the various benefits attributed to
CBFM by most of the literature on this subject. First, CFs are
usually considered as an option to secure rural areas for the benefit
of communities, especially in Central Africa in order to limit
future possibilities for the allocation by the state of new areas of
timber/crop concessions or protected areas (Nuesiri 2015,
Vermeulen and Karsenty 2015). Another objective of many
CBFM initiatives is also to more effectively recognize knowledge
and customary rights, which is presumably needed for sustainable
management of forest resources (Posey 1999). Last, community
forestry is also seen as a new approach for rural development,
where local capacity building for productive investment can be
undertaken almost independently of whether or not there is a
forest area.  
However, it is important to recall the primary ambition of
community forestry to contribute to enhancing the well-being of
communities through the efficient and sustainable use of forest
resources. In the DRC, Bauer (2016) reviewed most of these
initiatives and showed that a rise in local incomes from forest uses
is an objective that is rarely mentioned. This purpose cannot be
forgotten, especially in rural areas where development options are
scarce for local populations. It is high time to consider LCFCs as
investment projects for the benefit of communities, if  we want to
maximize the chances of their success and ensure that the tens of
millions of dollars devoted to supporting CBFM in the DRC help
to alleviate poverty in rural communities.
Responses to this article can be read online at: 
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/issues/responses.
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Appendix 1. Main characteristics and calculation assumptions of the sampled LCFCs 
Table A1.1: Variables and assumptions used for the cost-benefit analysis of the LCFC of Lolwa 
 
Surface area (ha) 298 903 
  Start of the process 2013 
  Accomplished steps SMP completed but not aligned with present regulations 
 Consulted 
documents 
SMP, multiple resources inventory report, training reports 
 
   
 Small-scale logging 
 Category Variables Assumptions Source 
Starting costs 
Social requirements 
("Cahiers des charges") 
One "cahier des charges" is required for each of the 11 
harvesting permits. Each logging permist covers an area 
of 20ha/yr 
SMP, our surveys, Lescuyer 
et al. 2014 
Official agreement for 
small-scale logging 
One agreement is required for each chainsaw miller official fees 
Purchase of chainsaws 
One chainsaw for each logging permit; unit price in 
Kisangani 
our surveys 
Training of small-scale 
loggers on improved logging 
techniques 
A one-week workshop for the 11 small-scale loggers by 
a national expert based in Kisangani 
our surveys 
Running costs 
Trees inventory in the 
annual logging area 
One inventory of valuable trees in each of the 11 small-
scale logging areas 
SMP, our surveys 
Purchase of the logging 
permits 
11 permits every year official fees 
Logging and chainsaw 
milling costs 
for 450m3 of timber per year SMP, Lescuyer et al. 2014 
Turn over 
Harvested area, timber 
species and volume 
215 ha are logged; 450 m3 of timber are logged from 3 
timber species (linzo, liboyo, mpunga); 150m3 of sawn 
wood are made 
SMP, Lescuyer et al. 2014 
Price of sawn wood 
Prices on the Kisangani market: 260 USD/m3 for linzo 
and liboyo; 290 USD/m3 for mpunga 
our surveys 
  
  Sustainable hunting 
 Category Variables Assumptions Source 
Starting costs 
Wildlife inventory wildlife inventory already done in the SMP SMP 
Purchase of rifles 
the wildlife inventory is already done for the SMP; 30 
hunters can do subsistence and (marginally) commercial 
hunting in the area, with 10 new hunters involved every 
year until Year 3; unit price of rifle on the Kisangani 
market 
SMP, our surveys 
Training 
10 hunters are trained in the first three years during a 
one-week workshop by a national expert based in 
Kisangani 
our surveys 
Running costs 
Wages, equipement and 
food 
Each producer does 2 hunts (of a few days each) per 
month, over a 9 month period. Most hunting activities 
are unpaid as done by the household, but hiring 
bushmeat carriers is often needed (25USD/month). 
Equipment (cartridge, knife, lamp,…) and food must be 
bought. 
our surveys, Valimahamed et 
al. 2017 
Harvesting permits 
10 permits for Year 1, 20 for Year 2, 30 permits for the 
following years 
official fees 
Turn over Harvested volume and price 
Each hunting trip provides an average income of 
150USD to the hunter 
our surveys, Valimahamed et 
al. 2017 
  
 
 
Charcoal production 
 
Category Variables Assumptions Source 
 Resource inventory 
Tree inventory for charcoal production is already done in 
the LCFC for the SMP: resource is abundant for the 5 
most valuable species 
SMP 
Starting costs 
Training 
5 fuelwood producers are trained in the first five years 
during a one-week workshop by a national expert based 
in Kisangani 
our surveys 
Oven 
Ovens are already available and will be maintained every 
year 
our surveys 
Running costs 
Wages for logging and 
cutting up 
Most activities of charcoal production are unpaid as done 
by the household, but some technical activities require to 
hire chainsaw millers. The average costs is 40 
USD/month/producer for an average monthly production 
of 25 bags 
our surveys, Schure et al. 
2014 
Maintenance of the oven 
maintenance and operating costs of 50USD a month for a 
monthly production of 25 bags 
our surveys 
Equipment (bags) Unit price on the Kisangani market our surveys 
Turn over Harvested volume and price 
Each producer trades 300 bags of charcoal every year for 
local and regional consumption. Charcoal bags are sold 
at the village gate price 
our surveys, Schure et al. 
2014 
 
 
  
Table A1.2: Variables and assumptions used for the cost-benefit analysis of the LCFC of Uma  
Surface area (ha) 49 995 
  Start of the process 2011 
  Accomplished steps SMP to be submitted, but not aligned with present regulations 
 Consulted documents SMP, socio-economic report, forest inventory report, gender report, expenses assessment report, annual activity reports 
  
  Small-scale logging 
 Category Variables Assumptions Source 
Starting costs 
Forest inventories 
Already done for the SMP for a logging area of 20 971 ha 
with a felling cycle of 25 years 
SMP, Forest inventory report 
Social requirements ("Cahiers des 
charges") 
One "cahier des charges" is required for each of the 15 
harvesting permits. Each logging permist covers an area of 
50ha/yr 
our surveys, expenses 
assessment report  
Building of a warehouse 5,000 USD by a Kisangani-based entreprise socio-economic report 
Official agreement for small-scale 
logging 
One agreement is required for each chainsaw miller official fees 
Purchase of chainsaws and 
bicylces 
One chainsaw and one bicycle for each logging permit; unit 
price in Kisangani 
our surveys 
Training of small-scale loggers on 
improved logging techniques 
A one-week workshop for the 15 small-scale loggers by a 
national expert based in Kisangani in Years 1-3-5 
expenses assessment report 
Running costs 
Road maintenance Wage to local labor for 9km every year Socio-economic report 
Trees inventory in the annual 
logging area 839 ha are inventoried and logged every year 
Forest inventory report, socio-
economic report 
Purchase of two pirogues Local production and price Socio-economic report 
Purchase of the logging permits 15 permits every year official fees 
Logging and chainsaw milling 
costs 
for 2431m3 of timber per year SMP, Lescuyer et al. 2014 
Turn over 
Harvested area, timber species 
and volume 
839 ha are logged; 2431m3 of timber are logged from 6 
species; 729m3 of sawn wood are made 
SMP, socio-economic report, 
forest inventory report, 
Lescuyer et al. 2014 
Price of sawn wood 
Prices on the Kisangani market for acajou, afrormosia, iroko, 
kosipo, sapelli, sipo 
our surveys 
  
  Sustainable hunting 
Category Variables Assumptions Source 
Starting costs 
Wildlife inventory 
Already done for the SMP for a hunting area of 26 214 ha 
with a 25 year harvesting cycle 
SMP, forest resources 
inventory 
Purchase of rifles 
15 hunters can do subsistence and (marginally) commercial 
hunting in the area; unit price of rifle on the Kisangani 
market 
expenses assessment report, 
activities report, our surveys 
Training 
15 hunters are trained in the first two years during a one-
week workshop by a national expert based in Kisangani 
activities report, our surveys 
Running costs 
Wages, equipement and food 
Each producer does 2 hunts (of a few days each) per month, 
over a 9 month period. Most hunting activities are unpaid as 
done by the household, but hiring bushmeat carriers is often 
needed (25USD/month). Equipment (cartridge, knife, 
lamp,…) and food must be bought. 
our surveys, expenses 
assessment report, 
Valimahamed et al. 2017 
Harvesting permits 15 permits official fees 
Turn over Harvested volume and price 
Each hunting trip provides an average income of 200USD to 
the hunter 
our surveys, socio-economic 
report 
 
 
